Florida's 287(g) Immigration Partnerships Expand With State Cash Incentives

Florida has become one of the most active states in the country for local participation in federal immigration enforcement, with the Walton County Sheriff's Office in the Panhandle receiving nearly $9 million in state incentives for its work under the federal 287(g) program. As of August 11, Immigration and Customs Enforcement reported having signed 2,179 memorandums of agreement for 287(g) partnerships covering 39 states and two United States territories.

The financial structure combines state and federal money. Beyond the state incentive payment, ICE reimburses Walton County $72 per inmate per day for detention, according to reporting on the arrangement. Sheriff Michael Adkinson has said his 287(g)-certified officers are used in a limited way, taking action when individuals are committing a crime or endangering someone in Florida.

Officers in the county became certified 287(g) officers last year through the program, which allows designated state and local law enforcement personnel to perform specified immigration enforcement functions under federal supervision.

How 287(g) works

Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act authorizes the Department of Homeland Security to enter into agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies, delegating certain immigration enforcement authority to designated officers who receive federal training and operate under ICE supervision.

The program operates through several distinct models. The jail enforcement model allows officers to identify and process removable individuals already in local custody on criminal charges. The warrant service officer model authorizes local officers to serve and execute administrative immigration warrants on individuals in their jails. A task force model permits broader enforcement authority during routine duties.

The distinction between models matters substantially. A jail-based agreement engages only with people already arrested on separate criminal charges. A task force model extends immigration enforcement into everyday policing, a difference that shapes both the practical scope of enforcement and the civil liberties concerns raised about the program.

Florida's policy framework

Florida has adopted state legislation directing local agencies toward federal cooperation. State law prohibits sanctuary policies and requires local law enforcement to cooperate with federal immigration authorities, a framework that positions Florida differently from states that have limited local participation.

The state incentive payments represent an additional layer, using state appropriations to encourage local agencies to participate more extensively than the statutory minimum. That combination of legal requirement and financial reward has produced participation rates in Florida that exceed most states.

Enforcement activity has intensified across the state in 2026, according to community reporting, extending from Miami-Dade County through Central Florida agricultural communities and into the Jacksonville area.

The federal enforcement picture

Individual enforcement actions in Florida have continued through the summer. On August 6, Homeland Security Investigations in Jacksonville arrested a Cuban national who had been issued a final order of removal by a Department of Justice immigration judge. The Department of Homeland Security separately announced the August 11 arrest of a Cuban national in Florida holding an expired commercial driver's license.

The nationwide expansion of 287(g) agreements to more than 2,100 memorandums represents a substantial increase from historical participation levels. The program has existed since 1996 but operated at a much smaller scale for most of its history, contracting significantly during periods when federal policy emphasized different enforcement priorities.

ICE has also paid incentives to local police departments nationally as part of the effort to expand enforcement capacity, a mechanism separate from Florida's state-level payments.

The concerns raised

The 287(g) program has generated civil rights litigation in various jurisdictions, with lawsuits alleging racial profiling in the way local officers exercise delegated immigration authority. Those cases have arisen primarily in jurisdictions operating task force model agreements rather than jail-only arrangements.

Law enforcement leaders themselves have been divided on the program. Some sheriffs argue that immigration enforcement participation improves public safety by removing individuals with criminal histories. Others have raised concerns that visible immigration enforcement by local deputies discourages crime victims and witnesses in immigrant communities from contacting police, undermining the reporting that investigations depend on.

Gov. Ron DeSantis has publicly criticized Florida sheriffs he viewed as insufficiently engaged with immigration enforcement, and that pressure has been part of the environment in which counties made participation decisions.

What it means for Floridians

Florida's immigrant population is among the largest in the country, and the state's economy depends on immigrant labor across agriculture, construction, hospitality and healthcare. Enforcement intensity in those sectors carries labor supply implications that reach beyond the individuals directly affected.

Agriculture has felt the pressure most directly. Florida's citrus, vegetable and nursery operations rely on seasonal labor, and growers in Central and South Florida have reported difficulty securing workers during periods of heightened enforcement activity.

Construction faces a parallel dynamic, particularly relevant given Florida's housing needs and the labor demands of post-hurricane rebuilding. Hospitality operations across Orlando, Miami and the coastal tourism markets employ substantial immigrant workforces.

For county budgets, the financial flows run in the other direction. The nearly $9 million in state incentives and the per-inmate federal reimbursement represent revenue for participating sheriff's offices, which is part of why the program has appealed to agencies operating under budget constraints.

Local impact across the state

Participation varies substantially by county. Walton County in the Panhandle represents one end of the spectrum, with the sheriff's office fully engaged and receiving the associated funding. Palm Beach County has taken a different approach, with its sheriff maintaining a more limited posture despite state pressure.

Miami-Dade County, home to the state's largest immigrant population, operates within the state framework while managing a community relationship shaped by decades of immigration from Cuba, Haiti, Venezuela, Nicaragua and across Latin America.

Rural agricultural counties across Central Florida face a distinct set of considerations, since enforcement activity directly affects the labor force that local agricultural economies depend on.

The history of the 287(g) program

Congress created the 287(g) authority in 1996 as part of a broader immigration enforcement statute, but the program remained small for years afterward. Participation grew during the mid-2000s, then contracted significantly when federal policy shifted toward prioritizing certain enforcement categories and away from broad local delegation.

The task force model in particular was discontinued for a period after federal reviews raised concerns about how local officers were exercising delegated authority during routine patrol activity. Its reinstatement in recent years restored the broader enforcement posture that model permits.

The current total exceeding 2,100 agreements across 39 states represents the largest scale the program has operated at in its history. That expansion reflects both federal policy priorities and state-level legislation in places like Florida that directs local cooperation.

Understanding which model a given county operates under matters for understanding what enforcement actually looks like there. A jail enforcement agreement produces immigration consequences for people already arrested on criminal charges; a task force agreement extends the reach into traffic stops and other routine encounters.

The economics of participation

The financial architecture around 287(g) participation has become substantial enough to affect county budget decisions independent of policy preferences.

Florida's state incentive payments, exemplified by the nearly $9 million directed to Walton County, represent state appropriations designed to encourage participation beyond statutory requirements. For a sheriff's office in a county of Walton's size, a payment of that magnitude is significant relative to the overall budget.

Federal detention reimbursement operates separately. The $72 per inmate per day rate reported for Walton County compensates the county for housing individuals held on immigration detainers. Whether that rate covers actual detention costs varies by facility, since per-inmate costs differ substantially between jails.

ICE has also paid incentives to local police departments nationally as part of expanding enforcement capacity, a mechanism operating alongside Florida's state-level payments.

The revenue dimension complicates the policy debate. A sheriff evaluating participation weighs public safety judgments, community relations and legal exposure against budget considerations that are concrete and immediate. Critics argue that financial incentives distort what should be a public safety determination; supporters counter that reimbursing counties for federal work they perform is straightforward fiscal fairness.

What agencies say about public safety effects

The public safety argument runs in both directions, and law enforcement leaders have taken positions on each side based on their assessment of local conditions.

Agencies that participate generally argue that identifying removable individuals already in custody on criminal charges is straightforward public safety work, removing people who have committed crimes from the community. Under a jail enforcement model, that argument applies to a population already arrested for something else.

Agencies that limit participation raise a different concern: that visible immigration enforcement by local officers deters crime reporting. Investigations depend on victims and witnesses coming forward, and police executives in jurisdictions with large immigrant populations have argued that fear of immigration consequences suppresses that cooperation.

Neither position has been settled empirically to the satisfaction of the other side. Studies examining crime rates and reporting patterns in jurisdictions with different policies have produced mixed findings, complicated by the difficulty of isolating the policy effect from everything else that varies between communities.

What is clear is that the choice carries operational consequences for agencies either way, and Florida's statutory framework has narrowed the range of choices available to local departments compared with states that permit more local discretion.

What's next

ICE continues to sign additional 287(g) agreements, and the program's total has grown steadily through 2026. Florida's state incentive appropriations depend on legislative budget decisions in future sessions.

Pending civil rights litigation in various jurisdictions may produce rulings that shape how the program operates, particularly around task force model agreements and the scope of delegated authority.

The Florida Legislature convenes its 2027 regular session in the winter, when immigration enforcement funding and any adjustments to the state's cooperation requirements would be taken up.